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INTRODUCTION
Imust begin with a word of thanks and a word ofapology. The thanks are due to David Gladwell, who ofcourse runs the Court of Appeal (and thus all our
lives). He is a member of the Friends of the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies and about six months ago asked me
if I would address this august body. So here I am, although
I am not sure if thanks is quite the right word. It is one
thing to agree to give a talk and quite another to prepare it.
Fortunately I have had the great help of John Sorabji in
doing so, although he has sensibly gone on holiday rather
than listen to me. Present or not, my thanks are due to
him. The good bits are his, the errors are mine.
The word of apology is that the title to this lecture does
not give any very clear picture of what it will contain. Its
purpose is to highlight the differing approaches taken by
the English courts on the one hand and the European
Court of Justice (“the ECJ”) on the other to the exercise of
its jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters. In
particular recent decisions in the ECJ have shown that its
approach to anti-suit injunctions is markedly different
from the approach adopted here, especially by the
Commercial Court and the Admiralty Court. The cases are
well known. They are of course Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT
Srl [2005] QB 1, Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101 and Owusu
v Jackson (t/a Villa Holidays Bal Inn Villas) [2005] QB 801.
These decisions and the rationale that underlies them to
my mind have important implications for the future.
Before turning to an analysis of them and their
implications I shall first say a word about the traditional
English approach to questions of jurisdiction and its
exercise, then turn to review the background and rationale
underlying the Brussels Convention regime and its aims in
an attempt to put the latest case developments in context
and to highlight the different approach taken here and in
Europe.
APPROACH OF THE ENGLISH COURTS
I have spent much of my professional life both at the Bar
and as a judge dealing with cases in which parties, usually
defendants, have done their utmost to avoid having the
dispute tried on the merits in England. Arguments of every
kind have been deployed over the years to persuade courts
that the interests of justice lie in the issues being
determined elsewhere, although in very many cases the
true position is that the defendant’s real interest is to
ensure (if at all possible) that the issues will in practice
never be determined at all.
The English courts have drawn a distinction between
due service of process, which is necessary to confer
jurisdiction on the court and the exercise of that
jurisdiction. Thus the court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction and grant a stay on a number of different bases,
depending upon the circumstances.
As to jurisdiction, the English courts have traditionally
accepted jurisdiction, at least in so far as actions in personam
are concerned, on four bases: presence in the jurisdiction,
consent, exercise of the discretionary power to assume
jurisdiction over parties out of the jurisdiction under what
was RSC Order 11 and is now CPR 6.20 and 6.21 and
international convention.
As to presence, it is to be noted that it was traditionally
presence and not domicile which founded jurisdiction. As
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to consent, many commercial parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of the English courts. Such consent can of
course be given in a number of ways. For example, litigants
domiciled outside England may voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction by appointing an agent in England to
accept service on their behalf: see Tharsis Sulphar Co v Société
des Metaux (1889) 58 LJQB 435. In such cases where
jurisdiction was established as of right, the court would
only grant a stay of an action where the defendant could
show that the proceedings were in some way vexatious of
oppressive: see eg McHenry v Lewis (1882) 22 Ch D 397 at
408 and Lord Morris’s excellent summary of the
development of this line of authority in The Atlantic Star
[1974] AC 436 at 455ff.
It was objected that this led to plaintiffs looking for a
forum which would be most favourable to them and to
undesirable forum shopping. Lord Denning’s answer to
that suggestion is to be found in his judgment in The Atlantic
Star [1973] QB 364 at 381–82:
“No one who comes to these courts asking for justice should
come in vain. ... This right to come here is not confined to
Englishmen. It extends to any friendly foreigner. He can seek
the aid of our courts if he desires to do so. You may call this
‘forum shopping’ if you please, but if the forum is England, it
is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods
and the speed of service.”
That has a certain ring to it, perhaps particularly
appealing to those practising commercial law in London.
However, it did not last. Due mainly to the efforts of Lord
Goff, who had, as counsel, argued for their introduction in
The Atlantic Star, the doctrine of forum non conveniens as
understood in Scots law were introduced into English law:
see The Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398. As I am sure all
present are fully aware, this doctrine seeks to ascertain
which country is a dispute’s “natural forum” and to resolve
an application for a stay or ant-suit injunction accordingly:
see Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC
460 per Lord Goff at 478. Where one party has brought
proceedings in England concerning, for instance, the
performance of a contract in the United States or Hong
Kong it will try to ascertain which is the most appropriate
forum to decide that dispute.
Why did the English courts adopt the Scottish
approach? The answer is I think clear. It is an expression of
the fundamental principle of doing substantial justice to
the parties in litigation. This was recognised by Lord Goff
in Spiliada. He said at page 474:
“In cases where jurisdiction has been founded as of right, i.e.
where in this country the defendant has been served with
proceedings within the jurisdiction, the defendant may now
apply to the court to exercise its discretion to stay the
proceedings on the ground which is usually called forum non
conveniens. That principle has for long been recognised in
Scots law; but it has only been recognised comparatively
recently in this country. In The Abidin Daver [1984] AC
398, 411, Lord Diplock stated that, on this point, English
law and Scots law may now be regarded as indistinguishable.
It is proper therefore to regard the classic statement of Lord
Kinnear in Sim v Robinow (1892) 19 R. 665 as
expressing the principle now applicable in both jurisdictions.
He said, at p 668:
‘the plea can never be sustained unless the court is
satisfied that there is some other tribunal, having
competent jurisdiction, in which the case may be tried
more suitably for the interests of all the parties and for
the ends of justice.’ ”
It is perhaps an example of the application of the
principle stated by Lord Mansfield CJ as long ago as 1768
in Alderson v Temple (1768) 4 Burr. 235, where he said:
“The most desirable object in all judicial determinations,
especially in mercantile ones, (which ought to be determined
upon natural justice, and not upon the niceties of law,) is, to
do substantial justice.”
See also per Lord Diplock in Bremer Vulcan v South India
Shipping Corporation [1981] AC at 977.
The English courts thus adopted an approach, rooted in
the jurisprudence of a civil law jurisdiction, which sought
to ensure that cases were tried in the most appropriate
forum in which their dispute can be resolved. This is a
pragmatic approach exercised on a case by case basis.
However, as is of course well known, the framers of the
Brussels Convention rejected it in favour of a simpler and
more certain approach, to which I will return in a moment.
In cases where there is no exclusive jurisdiction clause
and English jurisdiction is established as of right and the
doctrine of forum conveniens apply, it is for the defendant to
persuade the court that the interests of justice require a
stay of proceedings in favour of proceedings elsewhere. In
cases where there is no exclusive jurisdiction clause and the
permission of the court is necessary in order to permit
service of the proceedings out of the jurisdiction, the
claimant must satisfy the court first that the case falls
within one of the categories of case set out in CPR 6.20
and, secondly, that the English court is “the proper place in
which to bring the claim”: see CPR 6.21(1) and 2A. The
burden is thus on the claimant and not on the defendant.
This is consistent with the principles in Spiliada.
The position is somewhat different if there is an
exclusive jurisdiction clause in an agreement between the
parties. This is an area in which there is a stark difference
between our approach and that of the ECJ. In this class of
case (and indeed in the case where there is an exclusive
arbitration clause) the English approach has traditionally
been that, where the parties have agreed a particular
jurisdiction or arbitration in a particular place, the court
will refuse or grant a stay (or anti-suit injunction) in favour
of litigation or arbitration in the agreed forum unless there
are strong reasons for not doing so: see eg The El Amria
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119 and many other cases. I have 3
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often wondered why the courts conferred on themselves a
discretion to allow a party to proceed in breach of an
agreed jurisdiction or arbitration clause in a contract. There
are, after all, no other terms of a contract which the court
can disapply by the exercise of a discretion. In all other types
of case the courts would (at any rate in the old days) simply
have said pacta sunt servanda. However, that is by the by.
Until dealt what may be a fatal blow in Gasser and Turner
(at any rate in the European context), the English courts
adopted a robust approach to applications for anti-suit
injunctions. They were willing to grant injunctions to
restrain proceedings by claimants in other proceedings in
breach of English exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration
clauses. There are now many examples of this. It is
sufficient to refer to Continental Bank NA v Aekos Compania
Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 and The Angelic Grace [1995]
1 Lloyd’s Rep 87. In the first case the English court granted
an anti-suit injunction restraining proceedings brought
before a Greek court in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction
clause. It considered the question whether the procedural
rule set out in Article 21 of the Convention overrode
Article 17. It held it did not. In doing so the Court of
Appeal relied upon the principle that substantive law takes
precedence over procedural law. That approach was
identified as being embodied in Article 17, which gives
precedence to the courts of the agreed jurisdiction and
thus enunciates the principle of party autonomy: see
[1994] 1 WLR at 598. Thus parties should be held to their
bargains so far as jurisdiction agreements are concerned,
just as they should be held to other parts of their agreements.
The Court of Appeal took the view that to take any other
view would lead to what were described as “ludicrous”
consequences. The consequences which the court had in
mind no doubt included a device that we all now know by
the name of the Italian Torpedo, to which I will return in
a moment. It is the device whereby, for purely tactical
purposes, a litigant deliberately rushes to institute
proceedings (perhaps for a declaration of non-liability) in a
forum other than the one which has exclusive jurisdiction
under a contract. The forum chosen is usually one which is
renowned for slow moving civil process, which offers a
wide scope for procedural skirmishing. The tactical
purpose is of course to cause undue delay, unnecessary
costs and thereby pressurise the other party to settle at an
unduly low level. Its purpose is clearly antipathetic to the
achievement of justice.
In The Angelic Grace the court was not faced with the
breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause, but rather with
the breach of an arbitration clause. The court concluded
that there was nothing in principle to distinguish the two
types of breach. It thus concluded that the Brussels-
Lugano regime did not preclude the court from granting an
anti-suit injunction. Again the English court adopted an
approach which gave greater importance to holding the
parties to their bargain than to the operation of a formal
procedural rule.
Perhaps the clearest and typically incisive and robust
statement of this principle is to be found in the judgment
of Millett LJ in The Angelic Grace. I quote it in detail because
it is the high water mark of the English approach. He said
at page 96:
“In my judgment, the time has come to lay aside the ritual
incantation that this is a jurisdiction which should only be
exercised sparingly and with great caution. There have been
many statements of great authority warning of the danger of
giving an appearance of undue interference with the
proceedings of a foreign Court. Such sensitivity to the feelings
of a foreign Court has much to commend it where the
injunction is sought on the ground of forum non conveniens
or on the general ground that the foreign proceedings are
vexatious or oppressive but where no breach of contract is
involved. In the former case, great care may be needed to
avoid casting doubt on the fairness or adequacy of the
procedures of the foreign Court. In the latter case, the
question whether proceedings are vexatious or oppressive is
primarily a matter for the Court before which they are
pending. But in my judgment there is no good reason for
diffidence in granting an injunction to restrain foreign
proceedings on the clear and simple ground that the
defendant has promised not to bring them.
The Courts in countries like Italy, which is a party to the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions as well as the New York
Convention, are accustomed to the concept that they may be
under a duty to decline jurisdiction in a particular case
because of the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration
clause. I cannot accept the proposition that any Court would
be offended by the grant of an injunction to restrain a party
from invoking a jurisdiction which he had promised not to
invoke and which it was its own duty to decline.
…
We should, it was submitted, be careful not to usurp the
function of the Italian Court except as a last resort, by which
was meant, presumably, except in the event that the Italian
Court mistakenly accepted jurisdiction, and possibly not even
then. That submission involves the proposition that the
defendant should be allowed, not only to break its contract by
bringing proceedings in Italy, but to break it still further by
opposing the plaintiff ’s application to the Italian Court to
stay those proceedings, and all on the ground that it can
safely be left to the Italian Court to grant the plaintiff ’s
application. I find that proposition unattractive. It is also
somewhat lacking in logic, for if an injunction is granted, it
is not granted for fear that the foreign Court may wrongly
assume jurisdiction despite the plaintiffs, but on the surer
ground that the defendant promised not to put the plaintiff to
the expense and trouble of applying to that Court at all.
Moreover, if there should be any reluctance to grant an
injunction out of sensitivity to the feelings of a foreign Court,
far less offence is likely to be caused if an injunction is
granted before that Court has assumed jurisdiction than4
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afterwards, while to refrain from granting it at any stage
would deprive the plaintiff of its contractual rights altogether.
In my judgment, where an injunction is sought to restrain a
party from proceeding in a foreign Court in breach of an
arbitration agreement governed by English law, the English
Court need feel no diffidence in granting the injunction,
provided that it is sought promptly and before the foreign
proceedings are too far advanced. I see no difference in
principle between an injunction to restrain proceedings in
breach of an arbitration clause and one to restrain
proceedings in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause as in
Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA
[1994] 1 WLR 588. The justification for the grant of the
injunction in either case is that without it the plaintiff will be
deprived of its contractual rights in a situation in which
damages are manifestly an inadequate remedy. The
jurisdiction is, of course, discretionary and is not exercised as
a matter of course, but good reason needs to be shown why it
should not be exercised in any given case.
As appears later, the contrast between the views of
Millett LJ (and the other members of the court, namely
Neill and Leggatt LJJ) on the one hand and those of the
ECJ on the other is striking (to put it no higher). The
approach taken by the English court in these cases places
greatest weight on what commercial parties have agreed
between themselves in arriving at the conclusion that it had
the jurisdiction to impose anti-suit injunctions. Its
interpretation of the regime in both cases rested on a case
by case analysis of the merits of the particular case. The
court in both cases was implicitly asking the question as to
what justice, substantive justice, required it to do. Should
it consistently with substantive law hold the parties to their
bargain as to jurisdiction or arbitration? Or should it
interpret the Convention so as to give one party a
procedural advantage that would not only permit it to
evade substantive law but permit it to evade substantive
justice through use of a procedural device? The English
courts took the view that substantive matters took
precedence and that commercial parties who had reached
a bargain should be held to that bargain. Procedural law
should not be used to permit that bargain to be frustrated.
Its commitment to affording precedence to the
achievement of substantive justice informed its approach
to interpretation of the Convention.
I will return in a moment to the inroads which have
been made into those principles by Gasser and Turner.
The fourth class of case to which I referred earlier was
jurisdiction under an international convention. The only
such convention with which we are concerned this evening
is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 1965 as
subsequently amended. The relevant rules are now
contained in the Council Regulation (EC) Regulation
44/2001. I will call the whole system the Brussels-Lugano
regime.
THE BRUSSELS–LUGANO REGIME
The regime was intended to provide those countries to
which it applies with a single, uniform, jurisdictional
system in the field of civil and commercial private
international law. This aim was clearly set out in both the
Brussels Convention’s preamble and Rapporteur Jenard’s
report. It was intended to simplify, and render more
expeditious, the procedure for the mutual recognition and
enforcement of judgments of the courts of each
contracting state in other contracting states under Article
220 (now Art 293) of the Treaty of Rome 1957. That was
the Convention’s aim. It was not however a freestanding
one. Its aim furthered the implementation of a wider
Community goal, which as Rapporteur Jenard records (see
Jenard Report, preliminary remarks) was described in a note
sent by the Commission of the European Economic
Community to the six Member States requesting that they
commence the negotiations that resulted in the
Convention. The note stated that:
“a true internal market between the six States will be achieved
only if adequate legal protection can be secured. The economic
life of the Community may be subject to disturbances and
difficulties unless it is possible, where necessary by judicial
means, to ensure the recognition and enforcement of the
various rights arising from the existence of a multiplicity of
legal relationships. As jurisdiction in both civil and
commercial matters is derived from the sovereignty of Member
States, and since the effect of judicial acts is confined to each
national territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty
in the common market are essentially dependent on the
adoption by the Member States of a satisfactory solution to
the problem of recognition and enforcement of judgments.”
The overarching aim of the Convention was thus to
further the creation of a fully-functioning single internal
market for the EEC pursuant to, for example, Articles 3
and 7 of the Treaty of Rome. This aim had two subsidiary,
or what might better be described as, facilitative aspects.
First it required an increase in legal certainty within the
common market. As Jenard put it, the Convention sought
to bring about “a genuine legal systematization . . . (to) . . .
ensure the greatest possible degree of legal certainty” (Jenard
Report, chapter 4.2). This would in turn facilitate an
increase in legal protection of those individuals and
corporations domiciled within the common market.
These three aims have been stressed by the ECJ
throughout the past 38 years: see for instance: Owusu Bank
Ltd v Bracco [1994] ECR I-117. Equally they were stressed
in Jenard and Möller’s Report on the Lugano Convention: see
paragraphs 4–5 and 8–11. They were again emphasised in
the preamble to Regulation 44/2001 in the following
terms:
“(1) The Community has set itself the objective of maintaining
and developing an area of freedom, security and justice, in
which the free movement of persons is ensured. In order to
establish progressively such an area, the Community should 5
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adopt, amongst other things, the measures relating to judicial
cooperation in civil matters which are necessary for the sound
operation of the internal market.
(2) Certain differences between national rules governing
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound
operation of the internal market. Provisions to unify the rules
of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and
to simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple
recognition and enforcement of judgments from Member States
bound by this Regulation are essential.”
Legal certainty was stressed in paragraphs 11 and 15 of
the preamble.
The Brussels-Lugano regime’s aims can thus be
summarised as threefold: first, the creation of a single,
straightforward and supranational code governing
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments, which,
secondly, increases legal certainty surrounding such matters
in those nations which form part of its jurisdictional area
and, thirdly, thereby assists the creation of a fully operative
single internal market within those Member States.
The regime was to achieve these aims in two connected
ways: first, by providing a directly effective system of law, or
as in the United Kingdom’s case an indirectly effective one
in the form of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act
1982 (“the 1982 Act”), which overrode each Member
State’s own domestic law, except where recourse to such
law was specifically provided for within the regime itself:
see, for instance, Articles 1 (2), 4, 67 and 71 of the
Regulation, the corresponding Articles of the Conventions
and Sanicentral GmbH v Collin [1979] ECR 3423; and
secondly, by ensuring common, autonomous, interpretation
of its terms: see Mulox v Geels [1993] ECR I-4075 at
10–11. It was therefore not only a supranational
jurisdictional regime, but one which operated according to
supranational jurisprudence developed by the ECJ. It was
inevitable that the ECJ would develop a European approach
which would, at the very least differ from, and might well
conflict with, the approach taken by national courts.
Its operation was likely (as has proved to be the case) to
differ most starkly from the traditional English pragmatic
approach because it operates along formalist lines. This is
I think demonstrated by the three cases to which I referred
earlier and to which I shall refer in a moment.
The English approach to the Brussels-Lugano regime
The regime became part of English law and is now set
out in the Regulation, which has direct effect which is
recognized in Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001
(SI 2001/3929) and reflected in CPR 6.19. As a result,
subject to certain restrictions, permission is not required
in order to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction in
respect of a claim which the court has power to determine
under the Regulation. There is no room for the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, at any rate as between parties who are
domiciled in a Member State or Member States, because
the Regulation states which court has jurisdiction in each
class of case. Moreover, it has detailed provisions as to which
of one or more possible courts in different Member States
has jurisdiction. Its essential philosophy is that the court
first seised has jurisdiction and other do not: see Article 21
of the Convention (now Article 27 of the Regulation).
It is not necessary for me to set out the detailed
provisions of the Regulation here for two reasons. The first
is that you all know them by heart and the second is that,
if I did, this lecture would never come to an end. It is
sufficient to note that the basic principle that jurisdiction
depends on domicile is contained in Article 2 of the
Convention, now Article 2 of the Regulation. Article 16 of
the Convention (now Article 17 of the Regulation)
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in particular classes of
case. Article 17 of the Convention (Article 23 of the
Regulation) provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of a state in the case where the parties have included
an exclusive jurisdiction clause in their contract. Article 21
(now Article 27) provides that, where proceedings involve
the same cause of action, any court other than the court
first seised must decline jurisdiction. Article 22 (now
Article 28) provides that where actions are brought in the
courts of different contracting states any court other than
the court first seised may stay its proceedings.
It is right to say that the English courts initially took a
narrow view of the regime’s ambit. They did so by adopting
an interpretative approach to the Brussels-Lugano regime
which sought to keeps its ambit within bounds set by what
they took to be its primary aim: the creation of a single
market between the Member States. They took therefore an
approach to the regime which sought to retain as broad an
ambit of application for national law as was compatible
with that aim.
This approach was clearly evidenced in the decision in
the Court of Appeal in In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd
[1992] Ch 72. In that case proceedings were brought in
England in respect of the winding up of an English
company. An issue arose as to whether Argentina was the
more appropriate forum on the ground that the company
carried out its business exclusively in Argentina. The
Brussels Convention was (to use a Strasbourg expression)
prima facie engaged as the company was the defendant in the
action and was domiciled in England. However the Court
of Appeal accepted an argument that the Convention did
not apply because the question was whether the courts of a
Member State or the courts of a non-Member State were
the appropriate forum and the Convention only applied
where the issue of jurisdiction was as between the courts of
Member States.
In the Court of Appeal both Dillon and Nicholls LJJ
concluded that the Brussels Convention was limited in its
ambit to governing international relations between
Member States amongst themselves, rather than governing6
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Member States international relationships per se. They did
so by identifying the Convention’s purpose, in Jenard’s
words, as the creation of:
“. . . an autonomous system of international jurisdiction in
relations between the Member States. . .” (per Dillon LJ at
96.)
The single market was thus one that existed only as
between Member States. That its scope was limited in this
way flowed from its other aim, namely the creation of a
common jurisdictional basis for the mutual recognition
and enforcement of judgments between Member States. If
that was the Convention’s purpose under Article 220 of the
Treaty of Rome, it was difficult to envisage how the
Convention’s jurisdictional rules could apply in litigation
involving parties domiciled outside the Member States.
Bingham LJ adopted a similar interpretative approach,
although he did so by placing reliance on the aim of the
Treaty and the Convention to create for the various
Member States a single, jurisdictional unit between
themselves alone and to do so by replacing prior bilateral
agreements between several of the Member States: see page
101 et seq.
The rationale behind the Court of Appeal’s decision was
subject to a number of criticisms, of which the two most
serious are noted in Cheshire & North’s Private International
Law at page 264 as first, that it displayed a
misunderstanding of the jurisdictional ambit of the
Convention and, second, that it created uncertainty in the
law. In Owusu the ECJ has held that the decision was wrong.
The three decisions
Before looking at the issues raised by the three decisions
it is perhaps helpful to give an overview of them.
Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl [2005] QB 1
In Gasser proceedings were brought in both Italy and
Austria arising out of an alleged breach of a commercial
contract for the supply of children’s clothing. The first set
of proceedings was brought in April 2000 by MISAT before
a court in Rome. In August 2000 Gasser commenced
proceedings before a court in Feldkirch in Austria. Gasser
argued that the Austrian court was the appropriate forum
under the Convention because Austria was the place of
performance of the contract within Article 5 (1) and
because of a choice of jurisdiction clause in the contract,
with the result that the Austrian court had jurisdiction
under Article 17. MISAT argued that the Austrian court had
no jurisdiction as it was domiciled in Italy and that Article
2 applied. It also contested the validity of the choice of
jurisdiction clause and argued that the Roman court must
determine that question as the court first seised. The
Austrian court stayed the proceedings before it of its own
motion in accordance with Article 21. Gasser appealed.
The Austrian appellate court referred two questions to
the ECJ. It is the first of those which is of interest. It had
two limbs: first, whether a court second seised could
proceed to determine the case without waiting for the
court first seised to determine jurisdiction where it, the
court second seised, had exclusive jurisdiction under the
contract; and secondly, if this were impermissible as a
general rule, whether an exception to the effect of Article
21 could legitimately be made where the courts of the
Member State first seised were subject to excessive
procedural delay. The ECJ gave its judgment in December
2003 and answered both questions in the negative: the
procedural rule embodied in Article 21 took precedence
over Article 17 and no exceptions could be made to its
operation on the basis of internal aspects of a Member
State’s procedural system: see the judgment at paragraph
46–47 and 70–73.
Turner v Grovit [2005] 1 AC 101
Shortly before Gasser was handed down substantially the
same constitution of the ECJ heard Turner. The issue in the
action was straightforward. Mr Turner, a solicitor, was
employed by a group of companies as a legal adviser.
During the course of his employment he was transferred to
work in Madrid. He worked there for a very short period
before he sought to terminate his employment. He then
issued proceedings before an employment tribunal in
England claiming unfair dismissal. Having dismissed an
objection to the proceedings on the grounds of
jurisdiction, the employment tribunal found in Mr
Turner’s favour. While those proceedings were continuing
the defendants commenced proceedings against Mr Turner
in Madrid alleging a breach of contract. Mr Turner applied
for what is inelegantly known as an anti-suit injunction to
restrain the defendants from proceeding with the Spanish
action. An interim injunction was initially granted by the
High Court in December 1998 but the judge refused to
renew it in February 1999. Mr Turner appealed that
refusal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and
reimposed the injunction.
Laws LJ gave the leading judgment. The Court of Appeal
held that the English and Spanish proceedings were both
concerned with the same subject matter, namely the
termination of Mr Turner’s contract, and that as the court
first seised the English tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction
under Article 21. More significantly perhaps the court held
that the Spanish proceedings were brought merely to
harass and intimidate Mr Turner. As Laws LJ put it:
“. . . it is to my mind plain beyond the possibility of
argument that the Spanish proceedings were launched in bad
faith in order to vex the plaintiff in his pursuit of the
application before the Employment Tribunal here.”
He said that the court’s power to grant an anti-suit
injunction to restrain such proceedings derived from its
inherent jurisdiction to prevent the abuse of process and
that that power was not inconsistent with the Brussels
Convention. On the contrary he held that: 7
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“. . . the carefully constructed system of mutual recognition
between jurisdictions established by the Brussels Convention is
built on the premise that the courts of one State only will
hear the case, and its judgment may be enforced, without
further consideration of the merits, in any of the other
contracting States. To my mind it follows that where a party
in the courts of one State seeks to vex and oppress his
opponent by process against him in another State, directed to
issues which are being or could be litigated within the
proceedings in the first State, the case is to all intents and
purposes the same as one where, within this jurisdiction, one
party oppresses his adversary by the issue and prosecution of
multiple actions.”
Unassisted by the decision of the ECJ, I would have
formed the view that that reasoning was impeccable. The
defendants appealed to the House of Lords, which was of
the preliminary opinion that, where a second set of
proceedings was commenced in bad faith, there was no
inconsistency between the grant of such an injunction and
the provisions of the Brussels Convention: see [2005] 1 AC
at 106. However it referred the question to the ECJ. The
ECJ in a short judgment disagreed with both the Court of
Appeal and the preliminary view of the House of Lords.
The ECJ held that such injunctions were impermissible
because they were incompatible with the Convention and
they were incompatible with the Convention because they
ran counter to the doctrine of mutual trust between
Member States, which underpinned the Convention.
Owusu v Jackson (t/a Villa Holidays Bal Inn Villas) [2005]
QB 801
The third case raised the correct application of Article 2
of the Convention. Mr Owusu was domiciled in the United
Kingdom. He hired a holiday villa in Jamaica from the first
defendant, Mr Jackson. Whilst he was on holiday he
suffered a serious injury, which resulted in him being left
tetraplegic. The injury occurred while he was using a
private beach owned and operated by the second defendant
to which the terms of the holiday let gave him access. Mr
Owusu brought a claim against Mr Jackson in England for
damages for breach of contract. In addition he brought
actions in tort against five Jamaican-based defendants. Four
of the six defendants, including Mr Jackson, applied to the
High Court for declaratory relief. The basis of their
application was that the English court should decline
jurisdiction or stay the action pursuant to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. They argued that Jamaica was the
appropriate forum to hear the dispute because both the
five Jamaican defendants and the relevant witnesses had
closer links with Jamaica than with England and that the
accident took place in Jamaica.
At first instance the judge refused to grant the order
sought. He did so, following the ECJ’s decision in Universal
General Insurance Co (UGIC) v Group Josi Reinsurance Co SA
[2001] QB 68 that jurisdiction under Article 2 of the
Convention depended on the domicile of the defendant.
The judge held that, since the first defendant was domiciled
in the UK, the court could not decline jurisdiction or stay
the proceedings against him and that it followed that the
appropriate forum for the proceedings against the other
non-UK based defendants was England even though the
Convention did not apply to them and Jamaica was in one
sense the more convenient forum. It was more appropriate
for the English court to have sole jurisdiction for all
proceedings. Otherwise there was a risk that separate
proceedings in the two countries would lead to inconsistent
judgments on the same or similar facts and issues.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which
referred the following questions to the ECJ:
“(1) Is it inconsistent with the Brussels Convention . . .
where a Claimant contends that jurisdiction is founded on
Article 2, for a court of a contracting State to exercise a
discretionary power, available under its national law, to
decline to hear proceedings brought against a person
domiciled in that State in favour of the courts of a non-
Contracting state:
(a) if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State under the
1968 Convention is in issue;
(b) if the proceedings have no other connecting factors to any
other Contracting State?
(2) If the answer to question 1 (a) or 1 (b) is yes, is it
consistent in all circumstances or only in some and if so in
which?”
Both the Advocate-General in his opinion and the ECJ
in its judgment concluded that there was no scope for an
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens where a
defendant was domiciled in a Member State. It made no
difference to the exclusive applicability of Article 2 that the
dispute centred on a non-member state and the acts or
omissions of other defendants who were domiciled in that
state.
This decision was perhaps predictable in the light of the
court’s reasoning in Turner. In paragraph 35 of his opinion
in Turner Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer drew the
following comparison:
“The effects of restraining orders are similar to those produced
by application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
whereby a decision may be made not to hear actions which
have been brought in an inappropriate forum. Restraining
injunctions, however much they are addressed to the parties
and not to a judicial authority, presuppose some assessment of
the appropriateness of bringing an action before a specific
judicial authority. However, save in certain exceptional cases
which are not relevant here, the Convention does not allow
review of the jurisdiction of a court by a judicial authority of
another contracting state: . . . ”
The Rt Hon Sir Anthony Clarke
Master of the Rolls
